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INTRODUCTION
Every year, the United States grants political asylum to refugees
who have fled their countries because of persecution.1 Women and
children make up the majority of the world’s refugees.2 Often the first
victims of political and social turmoil, women are forced to flee their
homes to escape gender-related abuses such as rape, beatings, torture,
and sexual harassment.3 Furthermore, in societies fueled by social and
political instability, victims of gender-persecution are often left with
little recourse.4
Until recently, women’s asylum claims relating to such abuses
have been largely ignored under both the United States Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) and the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.5 In an attempt to extend “more
1. Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/
site/uscis (follow “Humanitarian” hyperlink; then follow “Refugees & Asylum” hyperlink;
then follow “Asylum” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
2. Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women,
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 625, 626 & n.1 (1993) (noting that “75 percent of refugees and
displaced persons are women and young children” (citing Susan Forbes Martin, Issues in
Refugee and Displaced Women and Children, Division for the Advancement of
Women/UNOV, 1, U.N. Doc. EGM/RDWC/1990/WP.1 (1990))).
3. Id. at 626.
4. Id. at 626-27.
5. Id. The INA is the statutory mechanism under which the Attorney General may
grant political asylum to applicants that satisfy the INA’s definition of “refugee.” INA
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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meaningful protection” to women refugees,6 the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees published its Guidelines on the Protection
of Refugee Women, which emphasized the need for states to recognize
gender-based asylum claims.7
In recent years, “[n]ew paths have been forged in the recognition
of women’s asylum claims based on forms of persecution that are
gender-based.” 8 In 1995, the United States Immigration & Natural-
ization Services (INS) issued new guidelines that formally recognized
“gender-based persecution” as a valid ground for relief under U.S.
asylum law.9 To qualify for asylum, women filing gender-based asylum
claims must show that they cannot return to their country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion . . . .”10
Although the INS issued these guidelines for evaluating women’s
asylum claims, there remains no “‘bright line’ test” to determine
whether a petitioner qualifies as a refugee under the INA.11 More
notably, by failing to make a distinction between male and female
applicants, the statutory definition of “refugee” under the INA
purports to remain gender-neutral.12 This Note will argue that the
failure to enumerate gender-specific provisions under the INA,
deprives bona fide female asylum applicants of the “special protec-
tion needs” reflective of gender-persecution.13
Part I of this Note will discuss the basic asylum claim: what must
be proven to qualify as a “refugee” under the INA statutory definition.
6. Kelly, supra note 2, at 659.
7. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women,
¶ 55, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (July 1991) [hereinafter Guidelines] (“Protection from sexual
discrimination is a basic right of all women and is enshrined in a number of international
declarations and conventions. While the universal right to freedom from discrimination on
grounds of sex is recognized, and discrimination can constitute persecution under certain
circumstances, the dividing line between discrimination and persecution is not a clear one.”).
8. SANA LOUE, IMMIGRATION LAW AND HEALTH: PATIENTS AND PROVIDERS § 10:46 (1993).
9. INS Publishes Gender Persecution Guidelines, 72 no. 22 INTERPRETER RELEASES
771, 771 (1995) [hereinafter Persecution Guidelines].
10. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Note that gender-based asylum
claims do not only apply to women. See LOUE, supra note 8, § 10:46 (noting that asylum was
granted to a Jordanian man who feared he would become the victim of an “honor killing”
due to his sexual, “non-marital” relationship with a Jordanian female).
11. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, to Immigration and Naturalization Service Asylum Officers, 
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women 8 (May 26,
1995) [hereinafter INS Memorandum] (on file with the U.S. Department of State).
12. Kelly, supra note 2, at 627.
13. Guidelines, supra note 7, ¶ 3 (“In addition to these basic needs shared with all ref-
ugees, refugee women and girls have special protection needs that reflect their gender: they
need, for example, protection against manipulation, sexual and physical abuse and exploit-
ation, and protection against sexual discrimination in the delivery of goods and services.”).
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Part II will discuss the framework for evaluating gender-based asylum
cases, including the standards set by the 1995 INS Guidelines. Part III
will explore how these standards have been applied by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the United States federal courts.
Part IV will argue that a successful asylum case turns on how the
adjudicating body interprets the term “persecution.” To qualify for
asylum, an applicant must prove that they have been “persecuted” or
face “persecution” as defined under the INA. Although the INS has
recognized that forms of “severe sexual violence” such as rape, sexual
abuse, and genital mutilation may constitute persecution, case law
has shown that the BIA and federal courts have interpreted these
harms disparately.14 A finding of persecution in the context of gender-
based claims is determinant on the specific facts of the case, which
court hears the claim, and even in some cases, what judge hears the
case.15 This Note will argue that to foster more consistency and
predictability in the adjudication of women’s asylum claims, there
must be an amendment to the INA definition of “refugee.”
Part V will propose an amendment to the definition of “refugee”
under INA § 101(a)(42), whereby gender-based persecution in the form
of rape, torture, and sexual assault will be identified in the statute as
a form of persecution. The proposed amendment will mirror a recent
amendment to the INA, which recognizes forced sterilization or forced
abortion as a form of persecution.16
I. THE ASYLUM CLAIM
Under the INA, the term “refugee” means:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion . . . .17
14. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
15. See infra Part IV (discussing the idea of asylum as “Refugee Roulette”).
16. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (“For purposes of determinations
under this chapter, a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such
a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion . . . .”).
17. Id.
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To qualify as a “refugee” under the statutory definition, an app-
licant must establish that they have a “well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.”18 An applicant may meet this burden by showing that they have
been persecuted in the past, or have a “well-founded fear of future
persecution,” 19 and that the persecution is “on account of” one of the
five statutory grounds enumerated in the INA.20 Furthermore, “an
alien must establish . . . that he personally would be singled out for
persecution on account of one of these statutory factors, or that there
is a reasonable possibility of such persecution.” 21
An applicant must also demonstrate that there is “no recourse to
state protection.” 22 Asylum will not be granted where the applicant
has been given refuge elsewhere or may avoid harm by relocating to
another part of the country.23 Ordinarily, the applicant must also show
that the “feared persecution” will be carried out by the government or
by a party the government is “unwilling or unable to control.”24
A. What is “Persecution”?
In all asylum cases, the adjudicating officer or court must deter-
mine whether the harm suffered or feared is “serious enough” to be
considered “persecution.”25 The more important question then
becomes: what is “persecution”? Although there is no universally
accepted definition of the term, and attempts to formulate such a
definition have not proven successful,26 the UNHCR’s Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status states that “a
threat to life” or “[o]ther serious violations of human rights” always
constitute persecution.27
The BIA has interpreted persecution to include “a threat to the
life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who
18. Id.
19. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2010). The regulations also state that a finding of past
persecution creates a rebuttal presumption that the petitioner also has a “well-founded”
fear of future persecution. Id.
20. Kelly, supra note 2, at 635-36.
21. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1986).
22. LOUE, supra note 8, § 10:46.
23. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii); see also Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution:
Protecting Women Under International Refugee Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511, 534 (1993)
(“The refugees’ inability to receive protection from their own government differentiates
refugees from ordinary aliens.” (citation omitted)).
24. Kelly, supra note 2, at 635 (citation omitted).
25. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8.
26. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/Eng/Rev.1 (Jan. 1992), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html [hereinafter Handbook].
27. Id.
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differ in a way regarded as offensive.” 28 The harm or suffering inflicted
includes confinement, torture, and “economic deprivation or restric-
tions so severe that they constitute a threat to an individual’s life or
freedom.” 29 Persecution is also found “when there is a difference
between the persecutor’s views or status and that of the victim; it is
oppression which is inflicted on groups or individuals because of a
difference that the persecutor will not tolerate.” 30
B. The “On Account” Requirement
In order to qualify as a “refugee,” an applicant must also demon-
strate that the past persecution or “well-founded” fear of persecution
has, or will be imposed “on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 31 The
phrase “membership in a particular social group,” however, has not
been specifically defined by the INA.32 Some commentators have
pushed for a broad interpretation of the term, arguing that “[t]he
‘social group’ category was meant to be a catch-all which could
include all the bases for and types of persecution which an imaginative
despot might conjure up.” 33
The UNHCR Handbook considers persons with “similar back-
ground[s], habits or social status” to constitute a “ ‘particular social
group.’ ” 34 The BIA, however, has taken a more restrictive approach:
“[P]ersecution on account of membership in a particular social
group” . . . [encompasses] persecution that is directed toward an
individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share
a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in
some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as
former military leadership or land ownership. The particular
kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construc-
tion remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However,
whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it
must be one that the members of the group either cannot change,
28. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985).
29. Id.
30. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985). In determining whether
threats or violence constitute “political persecution,” one may look to the motivation, views,
and political opinion of the persecutor. Id.
31. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a
Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 45 (1983); Kelly, supra note 2,
at 647-48 (citation omitted).
34. Handbook, supra note 26, ¶ 77.
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or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences.35
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,36 the Ninth Circuit enunciated a four-
part test to evaluate whether an applicant qualifies as a “refugee”
under the particular social group category.37 An adjudicator must
determine: 1) whether the group identified by the applicant is cog-
nizable as a particular social group; 2) whether the applicant is a
member of that cognizable group; 3) whether the “social group” has in
fact been targeted for persecution; and 4) whether special circum-
stances exist to create per se eligibility for asylum on the basis of mere
membership in that social group.38
In summary, to make a successful claim for asylum, the applicant
must prove persecution “on account” of one of the five statutory
grounds.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS
AND THE 1995 INS GUIDELINES
In 1995, the INS issued new guidelines for evaluating women’s
asylum claims based “wholly or in part on their gender.” 39 The
guidelines, which formally recognized gender-based persecution as a
potential ground for asylum,40 expanded the definition of “refugee” to
include those fleeing “gender-based persecution.”41 The Guidelines also
35. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
36. 801 F.2d 1572 (9th Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 1574-75.
38. Id.; see also Linda A. Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In Re Kasinga: A Feminist
Perspective on Recent Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 319, 329-33 (1996) (discussing In re Kasinga). Fauziya Kasinga, a nineteen-
year-old native of Togo and a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe sought asylum
in the U.S. to escape forced female genital mutilation (FGM). Malone, supra note 38, at
329. In evaluating her claim, the BIA relied heavily on the 1995 INS gender guidelines.
Id. 331-32. “[T]he opinion addresse[d]: (1) female genital mutilation as persecution; (2)
definition of the ‘social group;’ and (3) the applicant’s fear of persecution ‘on account of ’
membership in that group.” Id. at 332. The court found that Kasinga belonged to a
cognizable social group: “ ‘[y]oung women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not
had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.’ ” Id. at 333 (quoting
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 13-14 (B.I.A. 1996)).
39. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1. The guidelines were addressed to all INS
asylum officers. Id.
40. Persecution Guidelines, supra note 9, at 771. Through the INS Memorandum, the
United States became the second country after Canada to adopt “formal guidelines”
recognizing gender-persecution as a legitimate ground for asylum relief. Id.
41. See Cipriani, supra note 23, at 535 (“ ‘Governments should recognize as forms of
persecution, leading to the granting of refugee status, social and institutionalized forms of
oppression of women which contravene international judicial standards and constitute
violation of human rights, and should take measures to bring this to public attention.’”
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sought to address the need for more accurate and consistent decisions
in asylum cases brought by women:42 “[t]his guidance will serve as a
useful tool for new Asylum Officers, and will help to ensure uniformity
and consistency in procedures and decisions.”43 Following the adoption
of the guidelines, the BIA and federal courts have relied heavily on its
provisions to adjudicate asylum claims brought by women.44
The guidelines: “(1) review the historical and human rights
context in which guidance on gender-related adjudications has evolved
internationally; (2) emphasize the importance of creating a ‘customer-
friendly’ asylum interview environment . . . and (3) describe how such
claims should be analyzed within the framework of U.S. law.” 45
They state that gender-based claims must be viewed within the
framework of existing international human rights instruments that
advocate the principle that “women’s rights are human rights.”46 The
guidelines cite to relevant authority such as the 1993 U.N. Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which recognizes such
violence as “a per se violation of human rights,”47 and the UNHCR-
adopted Conclusion No. 73 on Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence,
which emphasizes that “asylum seekers who may have suffered sexual
violence be treated with particular sensitivity.”48
The guidelines also propose several procedural considerations for
asylum officers. The INS states, “[a]lthough women applicants fre-
quently present asylum claims for reasons similar to male applicants,
they may also have had experiences that are particular to their
gender,” which may be analyzed under one or more grounds.49 They
(quoting NANCY IRIS, REFUGEE WOMEN: IN 1985, NO LONGER THE ‘FORGOTTEN MAJORITY,’
1986 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 32, 33)).
42. Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for Women
Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 565, 568-69 (1993); see also Persecution
Guidelines, supra note 9, at 771 (“[T]he guidelines represent a ‘huge shift in the commit-
ment of the INS to gender-based cases’ and that they will result in more accurate decisions
in asylum cases brought by women.” (quoting Michelle Beasley)).
43. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1.
44. See Malone, supra note 38, at 329-34 (discussing In re Kasinga, wherein the BIA
relied on the gender guidelines found in the INS Memorandum to evaluate the petitioner’s
claim on whether she had established persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group).
45. Persecution Guidelines, supra note 9, at 771.
46. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2.
47. Id. (citing World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/DC/1/Add.1
(June 24, 1993)).
48. Id. at 3 (citing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Exec. Comm.
Conclusion No. 73 Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, Report of the 44th Session,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/821 (1993)). The Guidelines also cite to the Canadian Guidelines on
Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, the first formal
recognition of gender-based persecution claims. Id.
49. Id. at 4.
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further state that “rape . . . sexual abuse . . . domestic violence . . . and
genital mutilation are forms of mistreatment primarily directed at
girls and women and they may serve as evidence of past persecution
on account of one or more of the five grounds.” 50
A. “Persecution” as Defined by the INS Guidelines
The guidelines also attempt the formidable task of defining the
term “persecution.” 51 The INS adheres to the INA requirement that an
applicant must prove “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion” on account of one of the five statutory grounds.52 The asylum
officer must also make a finding of “ ‘persecution’ as [the] term is
understood under the relevant international and domestic law.” 53 In
making such a determination, “[s]erious physical harm consistently
has been held to constitute persecution. Rape and other forms of
severe sexual violence clearly can fall within this rule.” 54 Forms of
“severe sexual violence” such as “sexual abuse, rape, infanticide,
genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, domestic violence, and
forced abortion” are also explicitly recognized as possible forms of
persecution.55 The INS, however, states that although such harms
may be imposed because of the victim’s gender, the asylum officer
must assess “whether the specific harm amounts to persecution on
the basis of the general principles” of asylum law.56
In determining whether sexual violence constitutes persecution,
a claim involving “severe sexual violence does not differ analytically
from beatings, torture and other forms of physical violence” associated
with asylum petitions.57 The guidelines state, “[a] determination that
sexual abuse may be serious enough to amount to persecution does not
by itself make out a claim to asylum.” 58 The applicant must still
demonstrate that she has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of a “protected ground.” 59
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8-10.
52. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8 (quoting INA § 101(a)(42)).
53. Id. Domestic law being the INA, and the reference to international law suggests rele-
vant U.N. Declarations and Conventions regarding human rights and the status of refugees.
54. See id. at 9 (“Salvadoran woman raped and brutalized by an army sergeant who
denounced her as subversive had been ‘persecuted’ within the terms of the Act.” (citing
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987))).
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added) (“[P]ersecution . . . include[s] threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or free-
dom.”); see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (“Generally harsh
conditions shared by many other persons [do] not amount to persecution.”).
57. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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B. Private Acts as “Persecution”
To establish “persecution,” the petitioner must generally prove
that the harm was inflicted by the government or a non-government
entity that the government is “unable or unwilling to control.” 60
Numerous claims involving instances of rape and sexual abuse, how-
ever, tend to lack a “readily identifiable state actor or group.” 61
Furthermore, petitioners must also establish the motive of their per-
secutors.62 This is particularly difficult to prove in asylum claims
where petitioners lack access to direct evidence.63 This burden
becomes even more difficult when a persecutor is a “private actor.” 64
Some critics argue that rape and similar acts have traditionally been
viewed as “private acts” that are inflicted by “private actors.” 65 Linda
Cipriani argues that, “[i]nternational law has allowed the particular
concerns of women to be ignored because of its structural distinction
between public and private spheres.”66 Furthermore, immigration law
has tended to extend more protection to harms that are “publicly
oriented,” and discounted harms within the “private sphere.” 67
The INS guidelines attempt to clarify this disconnect between
“public versus private acts”: “[i]n the usual case, the government will
be the alleged persecutor. The question may arise, however, whether
an act committed or threatened by a government official was neverthe-
less a purely private one.” 68 Such cases often “involve public officials
60. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The threat of persecution need
not come from the government, but may also come from groups, including anti-government
guerrillas, which the government is ‘unwilling or unable to control.’ ”(citation omitted));
Matter of Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990).
61. Kathryn Fanlund, Our Safety or Their Lives? Legislative Changes Impacting
Immigration and the Risks Posed to Immigrant Women, 23 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y
135, 153 (2008) (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 152.
63. See id. (citation omitted) (explaining that most petitioners who have fled their
countries consequently do not have access to direct evidence that could be used to
demonstrate the motive of their persecutors).
64. Id. (citation omitted); see also Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing that Fisher, an Iranian woman, was denied asylum for failing to establish per-
secution on account of her religious or political beliefs). “Persecution requires the govern-
ment actor to inflict suffering on account of an individual’s religious or political beliefs,
race, nationality, or membership in a particular social group. . . Fisher [the applicant]
has the burden of showing the requisite connection between the Iranian government’s
acts and her religious or political beliefs.” Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
65. See Cipriani, supra note 23, at 539-40 (discussing the effects of the public/private
distinction).
66. Id. at 539 (citation omitted); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 625-34 (1991) (noting the concerns with the
public/private distinction).
67. Kristin E. Kandt, United States Asylum Law: Recognizing Persecution Based
Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137, 146 (1995).
68. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 16.
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who commit what is commonly seen as a private act.” 69 The guidelines
state that “[i]n such situations adjudicators must determine whether
a reasonable basis exists for regarding the act as a ‘public’ one that
can be attributed to the government or an agent the government is
unable or unwilling to control.” 70 Consequently, petitioners must
frame “private acts” such as rape or sexual abuse in the language of
the “public” sphere.
However, the guidelines recognize that in some cases a persecutor
will not be a state or government actor.71 In this case, “the applicant
must [still] show that the government is unwilling or unable to protect
its citizens” from such harm.72
III. GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION: THE CASE LAW
In all asylum cases, an adjudicator must make a finding of “per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution.” 73 Thus, relevant case
law turns on how the immigration courts, the BIA, and the federal
courts have interpreted the term. Although the INS has recognized
forms of severe gender-violence as persecution,74 the BIA and federal
courts have produced inconsistent judgments that have fostered a lack
of predictability and efficiency in administering these claims. While
adjudicators have extended protections to women asserting gender-
based persecution, they have denied similar protections to others.75
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of persecution in the context of
gender-based asylum claims stands in contrast to the decisions of the
Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits.76
In Lazo-Majano v. INS,77 the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a
Salvadoran woman who had been sexually abused by an army officer
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2006).
74. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the INS Guidelines).
75. See In re D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 78 (B.I.A. 1993) (showing the case of a twenty-
seven year-old female and native of Haiti whose application for asylum was approved). The
applicant had worked as a secretary in the government of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide and was also the member of a church group that had been formed by President
Aristide. Id. The applicant was gang raped and severely beaten by members of the Haitian
military and claimed that she was targeted for her political opinion and religion. Id. The
BIA found that the applicant had established a well-founded fear of persecution “based
on her political opinion and religion if she were returned to Haiti.” Id. at 79. But see
Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding “that there was no nexus
between [the] rape of a Filipino asylum applicant by Marxist guerillas and her imputed
political opinion”).
76. Kelly, supra note 2, at 638.
77. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
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over a period of years.78 The applicant, a domestic worker, had been
subjected to rape, beatings, and threats by the man she worked for,
Sergeant Zuniga, an officer in the Salvadoran armed forces.79 Lazo-
Majano also testified that Zuniga threatened to denounce her to the
military as a “subversive” if she resisted him.80 Lazo-Majano then fled
El Salvador with the hopes of seeking asylum in the United States.81
After an immigration judge denied her asylum claim on grounds that
“the harm she feared was strictly personal and did not constitute
persecution within the Act,” 82 the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision,
holding that the applicant had been persecuted on account of a polit-
ical opinion attributed to her by her persecutor.83 The court stated:
Persecution is stamped on every page of this record. Olimpia has
been singled out to be bullied, beaten, injured, raped, and en-
slaved. . . . The persecution has been conducted by a member of
the Armed Force, a military power that exercises domination over
much of El Salvador despite the staunchest efforts of the Duarte
government to restrain it.84
Conversely, in Gomez v. INS,85 the Second Circuit upheld a denial
of asylum to Carmen Gomez, a Salvadoran native, on grounds that she
did not present the evidence necessary to establish that she possessed
a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social
group . . . .” 86 The petitioner testified that “[b]etween the ages of
twelve and fourteen, [she] . . . was raped and beaten by [Salvadoran]
guerilla forces on five separate occasions.” 87 Gomez stated “that on
each of the five occasions, the guerillas threatened her life and
vandalized her home.” 88 Gomez contended that “by virtue of these
prior attacks she became a member of a social group, i.e., women
who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran
guerillas.” 89 She thus claimed to possess a well-founded fear of
78. Id. at 1433-34, 1436.
79. Id. at 1433.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1433-34.
82. Kelly, supra note 2, at 637 (citation omitted).
83. Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1435; see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 638 (“[T]he Court
also found that Sergeant Zuniga expressed an opinion regarding the nature of power
between men and women in his treatment of Ms. Lazo-Majano. Through her flight, Ms.
Lazo-Majano expressed the political opinion that men do not have the right to dominate
women.” (citation omitted)).
84. Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1434.
85. 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
86. Id. at 664.
87. Id. at 662.
88. Id.; Kandt, supra note 67, at 145 (citation omitted).
89. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663-64.
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persecution based on her membership in this “discrete group.” 90 In
reaching its holding, the court reasoned that:
A particular social group is comprised of individuals who possess
some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of
the outside world in general. . . . Like the traits which distinguish
the other four enumerated categories—race, religion, nationality
and political opinion—the attributes of a particular social group
must be recognizable and discrete. Possession of broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership in a particular group.91
The court found that Gomez had failed to show that future
persecutors would be able to identify members of this purported social
group and, thus, would not be capable of singling out individuals such
as Gomez.92 The court stated, “[w]e cannot . . . find that Gomez has
demonstrated that she is more likely to be persecuted than any other
young woman.” 93 Accordingly, the court found that because she
could not establish that guerilla forces were inclined to target her
based on her membership in this social group, she had not proven her
case for asylum.94
Although both petitioners from El Salvador, Lazo-Majano and
Gomez, complained of past instances of rape and sexual abuse by
authoritarian figures, the court in Gomez found that the petitioner had
failed to show that she had been persecuted within the terms of the
Act.95 The court in Lazo-Majano, however, found that the petitioner
had been individually targeted on account of a political opinion attri-
buted to her by her persecutor.96
Similarly, in Campos-Guardado v. INS,97 the Fifth Circuit upheld
a denial of asylum to Sofia Campos-Guardado, a  Salvadoran woman
90. Id. at 664.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 663, 664.
[A w]ell-founded fear consists of both a subjective and an objective
component. . . . To satisfy the objective component, the applicant for asylum
must submit documentary evidence or testimony alleging specific facts from
which it can be inferred that he or she may be singled out for persecution on
the basis [of one of the five statutory grounds].
Id. at 664.
95. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 662, 664 (“[T]he INS argues that regardless of Gomez’ tragic
encounters in El Salvador, she has failed to prove that she is a refugee, i.e., that her fear
of future persecution is based on her race, religion, nationality, political opinion or member-
ship in a particular social group, and thus she failed to qualify for political asylum or
withholding of deportation.”).
96. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
97. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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who had been violently raped after witnessing the politically moti-
vated murders of her family members.98 Campos-Guardado testified
that her family members, who were active in the agrarian land reform
movement in El Salvador, were attacked by armed locals.99 The
applicant was forced to watch while her uncle and male cousins were
hacked to death with machetes.100 The applicant and her female
cousins were then raped while a woman who was with the attackers
chanted political slogans.101
Campos-Guardado sought asylum on grounds that the rape was
inflicted on account of the political opinion of her family members that
was imputed to her.102 The court upheld the denial of her asylum on
grounds that the applicant “failed to establish that the rape was
motivated by a desire to harm her because of a political opinion that
she possessed or was believed to possess, and that subsequent threats
by her rapist were personal rather than political.” 103
In Klawitter v. INS,104 the Sixth Circuit denied political asylum to
a Polish woman who had been blacklisted for refusing to join the
Communist Party and was subsequently sexually assaulted by a
colonel in the Polish secret police.105 Klawitter testified that upon
returning from a five month visit to the United States, she was called
on several occasions to appear before the Polish secret police and was
harshly interrogated and threatened by the colonel.106 The court, how-
ever, found that the colonel’s actions were a result of his “personal
interest” in the applicant, rather than “any interest on his part to ‘per-
secute’ her.” 107 Consequently, such acts did not constitute “persecu-
tion” within the meaning of the INA.108 The court reasoned that:
98. Id. at 286, 291.
99. Id. at 287.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 288.
103. Kelly, supra note 2, at 639 (internal citation omitted). But see Arteaga v. INS, 836
F.2d 1227, 1227-31 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting asylum to a Salvadoran man who had a “well-
founded fear” of persecution). In Arteaga, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a
Salvadoran man following a visit by several of his old friends to his house a few years
earlier. Id. at 1228. Arteaga claimed that his friends, who were now part of the guerilla
insurgency that sought to start a civil war against the government, threatened that if the
petitioner remained neutral, they would be out to get him. Id. The court found that this
threat established a “well-founded fear” of persecution supported by the fact that the verbal
threat was directed at Arteaga, and his identity and residence were known by the guerillas.
Id. at 1233.
104. 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 150-51. Petitioner alleged that the Polish secret police colonel forced himself
on her and used violence against her while threatening to destroy her career. Id. She feared
his position of authority and power in Poland. Id.
106. Id. at 150.
107. Id. at 152.
108. Id. (finding that Niedzwiecki “persistently sought her out” because he found her
attractive and that he “simply was reacting to her repeated refusals to become intimate
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However distasteful his apparent treatment of the respondent
may have been, such harm or threats arising from a personal
dispute of this nature, even one taking place with an individual
in a high governmental position, is not a ground for asylum. . . .
[A]lthough petitioner’s testimony recounts an unfortunate
situation, harm or threats of harm based solely on sexual attrac-
tion do not constitute “persecution” under the Act.109
Despite the fact that the petitioner’s initial contact with the
colonel arose from her refusal to join the Communist Party (a political
act), the court failed to find a nexus between her political opinion and
the resulting harm.110 Furthermore, although the petitioner was
sexually assaulted by a high ranking official, the court concluded that
these acts merely manifested the official’s personal sexual desires
and did not stem from any political conflict.111
The Klawitter decision highlights the distinction courts place
between acts that are perceived as “public” and those perceived as
“private.”112 Consequently, acts found to be within the private sphere,”
such as sexual offenses are often not seen as “persecution.” 113 Nancy
Kelly argues that such “cases reflect the lack of a cohesive framework
within which to evaluate the gender-related claims of women.” 114
Although “[e]ach case raised a claim based on political opinion or
imputed opinion,” the courts made disparate determinations of when
“persecution” existed.115
IV. “REFUGEE ROULETTE” 116
On May 21, 2009, a San Francisco immigration judge granted
political asylum to Philip Belarmino, a forty-three-year-old English
Professor from the Philippines, who claimed that he feared persecution
with him”).
109. Id.
110. Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152.
111. Id.
112. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 17.
113. Kandt, supra note 67, at 151.
114. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 640 (“While arriving at contradictory results, neither
the Campos-Guardado court nor the Klawitter court attempted to reconcile their
decisions with the Lazo-Majano decision or to elaborate principles for determining when
gender-specific persecution will be considered politically-motivated.” (internal citations
omitted)).
115. Id. (citation omitted).
116. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007) (discussing the chance of being granted asylum
as a game of “Refugee Roulette”). The term “refugee roulette” refers to the concept that
one’s chance of being granted asylum is just as random as a game of Russian roulette—a
game of probability and luck. Id. at 296.
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in his home country because of his sexual orientation.117 Belarmino,
who was repeatedly subjected to rape and sexual abuse, fled the
Philippines to seek refuge in the United States.118 Belarmino testified
that due to the corrupt nature of the Philippine police, the State would
be unable to protect him from such harms.119 In this momentous case,
the immigration judge found that Belarmino possessed a “well-
founded fear” of persecution based on his “ ‘membership in a particular
social group’ ”: a homosexual in the Philippines.120
Eight years before Belarmino’s case, however, a San Francisco
immigration court rejected Jose Patricio Boer-Sedano’s (a Mexican
national) petition for asylum on grounds that “he failed to establish
past persecution on account of a protected basis.” 121 Although the
petitioner testified that he was sexually assaulted at gun point by a
“ ‘high-ranking police officer’ ” on nine separate occasions,122 the
immigration judge concluded that “the sex acts that Boer-Sedano was
forced to perform by the police officer were simply ‘a personal problem’
he had with this officer.” 123 The language used by the immigration
judge in this case reflects the tension between acts that are deemed
“public” and those that are held to be “private.” 124
After appealing this decision to the BIA, the Ninth Circuit in
Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales held that the immigration judge erred in
ruling that the petitioner failed to establish that he had been perse-
cuted within the terms of the Act.125 The court stated, “[w]hether
117. Rodel Rodis, Gay Filipino Gets Asylum in Historic US Case, GLOBAL NATION,
June 4, 2009, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/mindfeeds/mindfeeds/view/20090604-
208817/Gay-Filipino-gets-asylum-in-historic-US-case.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1085-87 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
immigration judge denied Boer-Sedano’s petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture).
122. Id. at 1086. Boer-Sedano testified that after his first encounter with the police
officer, over the next three months, the police officer targeted him on nine separate
occasions, ordering the petitioner into his official police car and forcing him to perform oral
sex on him. Id. On one occasion, the police officer put a gun to his head with a single bullet
in the chamber and began to play a game of Russian Roulette. Id.
123. Id. at 1087. The immigration judge “further concluded that the petitioner had not
established a well-founded fear of persecution because ‘he was not subject to systematic
persecution which prevented him from living his chosen life style . . . .’ ” Id.
124. See supra Part III (discussing Klawitter v. INS and noting that gender crimes such
as rape and sexual assault are often viewed as consequences of an attacker’s personal
sexual desires). In this case, despite the fact that Boer-Sedano was abused by a state
official, the immigration judge found that these acts were “simply a personal problem” that
could not be attributed to his membership in a particular social group. Boer-Sedano, 418
F.3d at 1087.
125. Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3d at 1088 (holding that the immigration judge “erred as a
matter of law by concluding that Boer-Sedano had not been persecuted”). The court found
680 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:665
particular acts constitute persecution for asylum purposes is a legal
question . . . . We have held that sexual assault, including forced oral
sex, may constitute persecution. Therefore, there can be no doubt that
the nine sex acts that Boer-Sedano was forced to perform rise to the
level of persecution.” 126
The court further stated, “ ‘[w]e have [also] consistently held that
death threats alone can constitute persecution.’ The IJ’s [immigration
judge’s] minimization of the death threat Boer-Sedano received from
the police officer may account for her failure to recognize that he
suffered persecution.” 127 The court also found that because the peti-
tioner had “established past persecution, he [was] presumed to have
a well-founded fear of future persecution.” 128
Although both petitioners complained of similar instances of
sexual assault, their presiding immigration judges came to disparate
conclusions as to whether these acts amounted to “persecution.” 129
Immigration attorney Rodel Rodis argues, “[t]he difference in the
immigration judges’ contrasting decision in the cases of Belarmino and
Boer-Sedano also show that applying for political asylum is like
playing Russian roulette—land the right judge and you win, land the
wrong judge and you lose.” 130
The concept that asylum adjudication operates like a game of
Russian Roulette can be attributed to an influential article entitled,
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication.131 According to
the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United
States received about 49,000 applications for asylum in 2008 alone.132
Of those applications, 22,930 petitions for asylum were granted.133 The
authors of Refugee Roulette argue that “in asylum cases . . . the
outcome apparently depends in large measure on which government
official decides the claim.” 134 They argue that “[i]n many cases, the
most important moment in an asylum case is the instant in which
that the immigration judge further erred by rejecting petitioner’s claim that he was
persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group by concluding that
“homosexual men in Mexico could not form the basis of a social group.” Id.
126. Id. at 1088 (internal citations omitted).
127. Id. (internal citations omitted).
128. Id. at 1089 (citation omitted).
129. Id. (citation omitted).
130. Rodis, supra note 117.
131. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
132. Krista Gesaman, Desperately Seeking Freedom: Are the Number of Immigrants
Seeking Asylum Over Sexual-Orientation Discrimination Increasing?, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
30, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/11/29/desperately-seeking-freedom.html.
133. Id.
134. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
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a clerk randomly assigns an application to a particular asylum
officer or immigration judge.” 135
The 2007 study analyzed databases of asylum decisions from four
levels of the adjudication process, including decisions administered by
884 asylum officers over a period of 7 years, 225 immigration judges
over a period of 4.5 years, 126,000 decisions of the BIA over a period
of 6 years, and 4215 decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals in 2004
and 2005.136
The authors contend that their analysis of these figures reveals
discerning disparities in asylum grant rates:
Given our national desire for equal treatment in adjudication, one
would expect to find in this system for the mass production of
justice many indicators demonstrating a strong degree of unifor-
mity of decision making over place and time. Yet in the very large
volume of adjudications involving foreign nationals’ applications
for protection from persecution . . . we see a great deal of statis-
tical variation in the outcomes pronounced by decision makers. The
statistics that we have collected and analyzed . . . suggest that in
the world of asylum adjudication, there is remarkable variation in
decision making from one official to the next, from one office to the
next, from one region to the next, from one Court of Appeals to the
next, and from one year to the next, even during periods where
there has been no intervening change in the law.137
They argue that the decision whether to grant a petitioner asylum
relief may be determined by which court or official presides over the
matter, as much as it is by the facts and law of the case.138 The study
revealed for example, that “Colombian asylum applicants whose cases
135. Id.; see also Rodis, supra note 117 (discussing a case involving two Egyptian male
lovers who filed for asylum in 2001). Because the two men were not married they could not
file their applications jointly. Id. In filing separately, they were ordered to appear before
two different judges in the same court. Id. The immigration judge for the first petitioner,
known for denying ninety percent of asylum claims that came before him, denied the
petitioner’s application for withholding of removal. Id. However, the second petitioner
who was assigned to a more “liberal” judge was granted discretionary relief for withholding
of removal. Id. Although both men filed almost identical claims alleging harassment,
beatings, hospitalization, and the lack of police response, they received different fates. Id.
136. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
137. Id. at 302. The authors argue that “[t]he very essence of the rule of law, embodied
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is that individual cases should be
disposed of by reference to standardized norms rather than by arbitrary factors, partic-
ularly the personal biases, attitudes, policies, or ideologies of government adjudicators.” Id.
at 299-300.
138. See id. at 302 (arguing that the fact that the outcome of an asylum case is heavily
influenced by the identity of the adjudicator is “particularly discomfiting [sic] in asylum
cases,” where such a decision will ultimately lead to the deportation of an individual who
may face grave danger upon returning to their home country).
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were adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5%
chance of prevailing with one of that court’s judges and an 88% chance
of prevailing before another judge in the same building.” 139 Similarly,
“a Chinese asylum seeker unlucky enough to have her case heard
before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of success on
her claim, as compared to 47% nationwide.” 140
The authors argue that a petitioner’s potential for success on an
asylum claim is affected not only by one’s assignment to a particular
immigration judge, but also by the gender of the immigration judge,
and his or her past work experience.141 In conclusion, they suggest
several solutions to this problem, such as “more comprehensive
training, more effective and independent appellate review, and other
reforms that would further professionalize the adjudication system.”142
Although the authors make a strong argument about the appar-
ent discrepancies in asylum grant rates, this Note argues that in the
context of asylum law, there lies a larger issue. Illustrated by cases
like Lazo-Majano v. INS and Campos-Guardardo v. INS,143 a decision
whether to grant asylum often centers around a finding of “persecu-
tion.” Such a finding typically turns on whether a specific act is identi-
fied as “persecution” by the adjudicating body.
In Lazo-Majano, the Ninth Circuit held that instances of rape and
sexual abuse by an army official constituted “persecution” on account
of a political opinion attributed to the petitioner by her persecutor.144
However, in Campos-Guardado, the Fifth Circuit found that the rape
of and subsequent threats to the petitioner by politically motivated
actors did not constitute “persecution,” and were merely personal acts
instituted against her.145
These decisions demonstrate that the standards employed to
evaluate asylum claims have been applied inconsistently, and have
thus created a system that lacks cohesion and predictability. In the
context of gender-based persecution claims, the lack of guidance as to
what definitively constitutes “persecution” has left the term open to
different levels of interpretation. One would hope that in the context
of criminal law, experienced judges would not need “more comprehen-
sive training” in order to make consistent determinations of the law.
139. Id. at 296 (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 329 (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 296.
142. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
143. See supra Part III (discussing both cases).
144. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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V. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO INA § 101(A)(42): QUALIFYING THE
TERM “REFUGEE”
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees has recog-
nized the importance of extending greater protection to victims of
gender-based persecution.146 The 1991 UNHCR Guidelines state: “[i]n
addition to these basic needs shared with all refugees, refugee women
and girls have special protection needs that reflect their gender: they
need, for example, protection against manipulation, sexual and phy-
sical abuse and exploitation . . . .” 147 The United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly known as the INS,148 has
also recognized these special protection needs of women refugees
through the 1995 INS Guidelines.149
From the case law, however, it is palpable that asylum adjudica-
tors have an unrestrained freedom to interpret whether gender-based
harms satisfy the INA definition of “persecution.” These guidelines are
only guidelines. They are yet to be integrated into the immigration law
or federal regulations. Therefore, adjudicators may look to these
guidelines when evaluating gender-based persecution claims, but they
are not bound by them.
Furthermore, the statutory definition of “refugee” under the INA
remains gender neutral. This Note argues that in order to realize
these “special protection needs” of women and girls, there must be an
amendment to the INA definition of “refugee,” whereby gender-based
harms such as rape, and sexual and physical abuse are formally iden-
tified in the statute as a form of persecution. Through such an amend-
ment, adjudicators will be increasingly bound to interpret these crimes
against women as persecution and not merely private sexual acts.150
Such an amendment, as applied, should however be limited to
bona fide asylum petitioners and be evaluated according to the general
principles of asylum law. An asylum applicant must still make a show-
ing that they have been persecuted in the past or have a “well-founded”
fear of future persecution “on account of ” one of the five statutory
grounds: “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” 151 An applicant must also still show
146. Guidelines, supra note 7, ¶ 4.
147. Id. ¶ 3.
148. Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow “Our History” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 29, 2011).
149. See INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1 (declaring that the purpose of the 1995
Guidelines was to enhance the understanding of and sensitivity to gender-related
asylum issues).
150. See Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the rape of the
applicant was a “private” act not subject to asylum protection).
151. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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that the gender-persecution was or will be carried out by a govern-
ment actor or by a party that the government is “ ‘unwilling or unable
to control.’ ” 152
A. The 1996 Amendment
In 1996, Congress passed an amendment to the definition of “ref-
ugee” under INA § 101(a)(42).153 This amendment formally recognized
that a threat of forced abortion or involuntary sterilization constituted
a per se form of persecution.154 The amendment, which was driven by
domestic outrage against China’s One-Child Policy, sought to target
the abuses that resulted from the enforcement of this population
control program.155 In an effort to control the country’s expanding popu-
lation, China’s One-Child Policy “encourages” couples to limit child-
bearing to one child.156
In Matter of Chang,157 the BIA denied asylum to an applicant who
claimed that he would be forced to undergo involuntary sterilization
as a result of China’s repressive policy.158 The BIA found that the “one
couple, one child” policy was not “on its face persecutive” and thus the
applicant could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution as
defined by the statute.159
However, in Guo Chun Di v. Carroll,160 a federal judge reversed
the denial of asylum to a Chinese petitioner who had fled the country
to avoid imprisonment and involuntary sterilization.161 The court
held that “[i]nvoluntary sterilization, in particular, has been viewed
as an egregious infringement on the fundamental right to procre-
ate,” and that the petitioner’s refusal to comply with the One-Child
Policy “constitute[d] a ‘political opinion.’ ” 162
152. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
153. Michelle Chen, Leaving One-Child Behind: Chinese Immigrants Seek Asylum in
America from China’s One-Child Policy, LEGAL AFF., Nov. 2005, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2005/scene_chen_novdec05.msp.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Laura Fitzpatrick, A Brief History of China’s One-Child Policy, TIME, July 27,
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1912861,00.html. The
One-Child Policy relies on a policy of “sticks and carrots,” where couples are rewarded
for limiting childbearing. Id. Couples, however, are fined for having a “supernumerary”
child without a permit from the Chinese government. Id. Reports of forced abortions and
sterilization of women by officials are, however, commonplace. Id.
157. 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989).
158. Id. at 39.
159. Id. at 43.
160. 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1994).
161. Id. at 873-74.
162. Id. at 872 (citation omitted).
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The 1996 Amendment thus sought to create consistency in the
adjudication of asylum claims involving forced abortion and steriliza-
tion. Michelle Chen states, “[c]larifying a longstanding legal gray area,
the statute granted asylum status to women who had been forced to
have an abortion or had been sterilized . . . .” 163 In further qualifying
the definition of “refugee,” the Amendment states:
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive popu-
lation control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on
account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded
fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall
be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion.164
The language of the statute specifically enumerates that a person
who is forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo involuntary steriliza-
tion, or fears that they will be forced to undergo such a procedure, has
established per se persecution or a well founded fear of persecution on
account of their political opinion.165 It follows that this amendment has
facilitated more consistent decision-making, which in turn has affor-
ded greater protection to Chinese asylum claimants.166
B. A New Amendment: Qualifying Gender-Based Harms
This Note proposes a similar amendment to the current definition
of “refugee” found in INA § 101(a)(2). The proposed amendment should
state that persons who have suffered severe sexual or physical harm
or have a well-founded fear of suffering such harm at the hands of the
government or an actor the government is unable to control, have
established per se persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.
The petitioner must nevertheless show that the resulting persecution
can be imputed to one of the five protected grounds: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Although this Note argues for an amendment similar to the 1996
Amendment, the concerns regarding immeasurable access to asylum
relief posed by China’s One-Child Policy are not applicable in this
163. Chen, supra note 153.
164. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2006).
165. Id.
166. Chen, supra note 153 (“[P]ersecution under Chinese family-planning laws is a
uniquely convenient basis for an asylum claim.”).
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context. Critics argue that because China’s One-Child Policy is “uni-
versally” applied, the amendment has “opened the flood gates,” so
to speak, to “any Chinese citizen who has faced the legal consequences
of having or trying to have more than one child.” 167 In 2003, USCIS
received more than 14,000 new Chinese asylum claims.168 The State
Department estimated that about half of the Chinese asylum petitions
involved China’s family-planning laws.169
China’s family-planning laws, however, are advocated as a uni-
formly applied policy that applies to all men and women in China.
Gender-based sexual harms such as rape and sexual assault on the
other hand are inflicted on individuals by their persecutors. To make
a successful claim for asylum, a petitioner must show that they were
individually targeted by their persecutor on account of one of the five
statutory bases.170 Thus, the threat of extending too much protection
to women and girls who suffer sexual and physical abuse is lacking.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, domestic and international bodies have recog-
nized the compelling need to extend more meaningful protection to
women refugees and victims of gender-based persecution. As previ-
ously mentioned, women and children represent the majority of the
world’s displaced refugees.171 The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees has declared that women and children need special
protection from harms that are reflective of their gender.172 Often left
with little recourse to the state, these victims are unable to protect
themselves from gender-based sexual and physical abuse harms.173
The Rome Statute, the treaty which formally established the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002, declares that sexual
slavery, forced prostitution, rape, and other forms of grave sexual
violence constitute crimes against humanity.174 These acts have also
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting the petitioner did not
present evidence of persecution on account of one of the five bases).
171. Kelly, supra note 2, at 625.
172. Guidelines, supra note 7, ¶ 3.
173. Persecutors often represent members of the police, armed forces, and
authoritarian figures. Many victims are also citizens of countries that lack the capability
or enthusiasm to pursue complaints of such abuse. See supra Part III (discussing asylum
cases where persecution was claimed).
174. WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AD DOC TRIBUNAL’S JURISPRUDENCE & THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 8 (2005), http://www.iccwomen.org
/publications/resources/docs/Overview_Sexual_Violence_and_International_Criminal_
Law.pdf (prepared by Angela M. Banks).
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been prosecuted by the ICC as war crimes.175 It is evident that these
are serious harms that warrant protection from the international
community.
Although the 1995 INS Guidelines and relevant case law have
achieved some greater protection for women refugees, there remains
a lack of consistency and predictability in the adjudication of gender-
based asylum claims. By specifically recognizing these harms as forms
of persecution, adjudicators would no longer have the unrestrained
power to determine whether one act of rape is sufficiently “persecu-
tion” and another similar instance lacks the muster. As previously dis-
cussed, a successful asylum claim turns on how the term “persecution”
is interpreted.176
In cases like Klawitter v. INS, the Sixth Circuit interpreted such
harms within the context of the “private sphere,” where sexual crimes
do not warrant protection from international governments.177 How-
ever, in Lazo-Majano v. INS, the Ninth Circuit rejected the view that
rape conducted by an army officer was a “ ‘strictly personal’ ” harm that
did “ ‘not constitute persecution within the meaning of the Act.’ ” 178
By formally identifying such instances of rape and sexual violence
as forms of “persecution,” the proposed amendment would likely facili-
tate more uniformity in the adjudication of these claims. This amend-
ment would hopefully create greater protection to the women and
children that are victims of these atrocities.
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